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Abstract
Free-rider attacks on federated learning consist in dissimulating participation to
the federated learning process with the goal of obtaining the final aggregated
model without actually contributing with any data. We introduce here the first
theoretical and experimental analysis of free-rider attacks on federated learning
schemes based on iterative parameters aggregation, such as FedAvg or FedProx,
and provide formal guarantees for these attacks to converge to the aggregated
models of the fair participants. We first show that a straightforward implementation
of this attack can be simply achieved by not updating the local parameters during
the iterative federated optimization. As this attack can be detected by adopting
simple countermeasures at the server level, we subsequently study more complex
disguising schemes based on stochastic updates of the free-rider parameters. We
demonstrate the proposed strategies on a number of experimental scenarios, in
both iid and non-iid settings. We conclude by providing recommendations to avoid
free-rider attacks in real world applications of federated learning, especially in
sensitive domains where security of data and models is critical.
1 Introduction
Federated learning is a training paradigm that has gained popularity in the last years as it enables
different clients to jointly learn a global model without sharing their respective data. It is particularly
suited for Machine Learning applications in domains where data security is critical, such as healthcare
[1, 2]. The relevance of this approach is witnessed by current large scale federated learning initiatives
on the way in the medical domain, for instance for learning predictive models of breast cancer1, or
for drug discovery and development2.
In this setting, aggregation results entail critical information beyond data itself: a model trained on
exclusive datasets may have very high commercial or intellectual value. This critical aspect can lead
to the emergence of opportunistic behaviors in federated learning, where ill-intentioned clients may
be participating with the unique scope of obtaining the federated model, without actually contributing
with any data during the training process. In particular, the attacker, or free-rider, aims at disguising
1blogs.nvidia.com/blog/2020/04/15/federated-learning-mammogram-assessment/
2www.imi.europa.eu/projects-results/project-factsheets/melloddy
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its participation to federated learning while ensuring that the iterative training process ultimately
converges to the wished target: the aggregated model of the fair participants.
The study of security and safety of federated learning is an active research domain, and several
kind of attacks have been studied. For example, an attacker may interfere during the iterative
federated learning procedure to degrade/modify models performances [3, 4, 5, 6, 7], or retrieve
information about other clients data [8, 9]. Yet, free-riding for federated learning has been so far
under-investigated in the literature. To the best of our knowledge, the only investigation is in a
preliminary work [10] focusing on attack strategies operated on federated learning based on gradient
aggregation. However, no theoretical guarantees are provided for the effectiveness of this kind of
proposed attacks. Furthermore this setup is unpractical in many real world applications, where
federated training schemes based on model averaging are instead more common, due to the reduced
data exchange across the network. FedAvg [11] is the most representative framework of this kind, as is
based on the iterative averaging of the clients models’ parameters, after updating each client model for
a given number of training epochs at the local level. To improve the robustness of FedAvg in non-iid
and heterogeneous learning scenarios, FedProx [12] extends FedAvg by including a regularization
term penalizing local departures of clients’ parameters from the global model.
The contribution of this work consists in the development of a theoretical framework for the develop-
ment and study of free-rider attacks in federated learning schemes based on model averaging, such as
in FedAvg and FedProx. The problem is here formalized via the reformulation of federated learning as
a stochastic dynamical system describing the evolution of the aggregated parameters across iterations.
A critical requirement for this kind of opportunistic attacks is to ensure the convergence of the training
process to the wished target represented by the aggregated model of the fair clients. We show that the
proposed framework allows to derive explicit conditions for guaranteeing the success of the attack.
This is an important theoretical feature as it is of primary interest for the attacker not to interfere with
the learning process.
We first derive in Section 2.3 a basic free-riding strategy to guarantee the convergence of federated
learning to the model of the fair participants. This strategy simply consists in returning at each
iteration the received global parameters. As this behavior can easily be detected by the server, we
build more complex strategies to disguise the free-rider contribution to the optimization process,
based on opportune stochastic perturbations of the parameters. We demonstrate in Section 2.4 that this
strategy does not alter the global model convergence, and in Section 3 we experimentally demonstrate
our theory on a number of learning scenarios in both iid and non-iid settings. We conclude by
investigating advanced strategies for designing and identifying free-riders’ attacks. All proofs and
additional material are provided in the Appendix.
2 Methods
Before introducing in Section 2.2 the core idea of free-rider attacks, we first recapitulate in Section
2.1 the general context of parameter aggregation in federated learning.
2.1 Federated learning through model aggregation: FedAvg and FedProx
In federated learning, we consider a set I of participating clients respectively owning dataset Di
composed by Mi samples. During optimization, it is generally assumed that the D elements
of the clients’ parameters vector θ˜i(t) = (θ˜i,0(t), θ˜i,1(t), .., θ˜i,D(t)), and the global parameters
θ(t) = (θ0(t), θ1(t), .., θD(t)) are aggregated independently at each iteration round t. Following
this assumption, and for simplicity of notation, in what follows we restrict our analysis to a single
parameter entry, that in will be generally denoted by θ˜i(t) and θ(t) for clients and server respectively.
In this setting, to estimate a global model across clients, FedAvg [11] is an iterative training strategy
based on the aggregation of local model parameters θ˜i(t). At each iteration step t, the server sends
the current global model parameters θ(t) to the clients. Each client updates the model by minimizing
over E epochs the local cost function L(θ˜i(t),Di) initialized with θ(t), and subsequently returns the
updated local parameters θ˜i(t) to the server. The global model parameters θ(t+ 1) at the iteration
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step t+ 1 are then estimated as a weighted average:
θ(t+ 1) =
∑
i∈I
Mi
N
θ˜i(t), (1)
where N =
∑
i∈IMi represents the total number of samples across distributed datasets. FedProx
[12] builds on FedAvg by adding to the cost function a L2 regularization term penalizing the
deviation of the local parameters θ˜i(t) from the global parameters θ(t). The new cost function is
LProx(θ˜i(t),Di) = L(θ˜i(t),Di) + µ2
∥∥∥θ˜i(t)− θ(t)∥∥∥2 where µ is the hyperparameter monitoring the
regularization by enforcing proximity between local updates and the global model.
2.2 Formalizing Free-rider attacks
The strategy of a free-rider consists in participating to federated learning by dissimulating local
updating through the sharing of opportune counterfeited parameters with the aim of obtaining the
aggregated model of the fair clients.
We denote by J the set of fair clients, i.e. clients following the federated learning strategy of Section
(2.1) and by K the set of free-riders, i.e. malicious clients pretending to participate to the learning
process, such that I = J ∪K and J 6= ∅. We denote by MK the number of samples declared by the
free-riders, and we introduce the parameter β = MKN − 1 ∈ [−1, 0] which quantifies the amount of
free-riders’ samples relative to the total number of training samples N .
We assume that, in absence of free-riders, clients’ parameters observed during federated learning
are realisations from time-varying processes θ˜j(t) = θj(t) + ρjζj(t), where θj(t) are smoothly
convergent functions and ζj(t) is a noisy process, here assumed to be delta-correlated unit variance
Gaussian white noise, modulated by the parameter ρj (this assumption will be relaxed in Section
2.4.2). The participation of the free-riders to federated learning implies that the processes of the fair
clients are being perturbed by the attacks throughout training. In particular, perturbing the aggregation
(1) at the server level implies, on each client’s side, a perturbation of the initial condition for the
local optimization problem. We therefore assume that each fair client’s parameters evolution under
free-rider attacks follows the perturbed trajectory θ˜j(t) = θj(t)+ρjζj(t)+η(1+β)φj(t), with φj(t)
a Gaussian white noise process. The perturbation is proportional to the number of samples declared
by the free-riders, and its magnitude is controlled by the parameter η. This assumption accounts for
the potential non-convexity of the problem at the client’s level where, for a certain perturbation of the
aggregated parameters θ(t), the parameters returned by the fair client would fall in a neighbourhood
of the original process θ˜j(t). As we shall see in the following Sections, the extent of the perturbation,
i.e. the noise level η, determines the quality of the free-rider attack.
In the next Section we show that a basic free-rider strategy simply consists in returning at each
iteration the received global parameters: θk(t) = θ(t). We call this type of attack plain free-riding.
2.3 Plain free-riding
The plain free-rider returns the same model parameters as the received ones, i.e. ∀k ∈ K, θk(t) =
θ(t). In this setting, the server aggregation process (1) can be rewritten as:
θ(t+ 1) =
∑
j∈J
Mj
N
θ˜j(t) +
MK
N
θ(t) . (2)
Before proceeding with the development of equation (2), to have a better intuition of FedAvg under
free-rider attacks, let us consider the simplified setting in which the fair clients parameters θj are
assumed to be constant, i.e. ∀j ∈ J, θ˜j(t) = θj . This is equivalent to consider that the optimization
process is close enough to the optimum for all the clients, which return the same local parameters θj
at each global update step. We rewrite the server aggregation process (2) as follows:
θ(t+ 1)− θ(t) =
∑
j∈J
Mj
N
θj + βθ(t). (3)
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Considering an infinitesimal increment of time, we obtain the first order differential equation:
θ˙(t) = βθ(t) +
∑
j∈J
Mj
N
θj , (4)
for which the solution is θ(t) = eβtθ(0) +
∑
j∈J
Mj
N−MK θj(1 − eβt), where θ(0) is the training
initialization. This expression shows that in this simple setting, the global model with plain free-
riders converges to the aggregated model of the fair clients: since β < 0 we obtain θ(t) t→+∞−−−−→∑
j∈J
Mj
N−MK θj . Also, the relative sample size declared by the free-riders
MK
N influences the
convergence with exponential speed O(eβt). In practice, the smaller the ratio of data declared by
the free-riders, the faster the trained model converges to its optimum, thus approaching the final
model with fair clients. The limit case MK = N , i.e. β = 0, which corresponds to only free-riders
participating to federated learning (J = ∅), leads to the trivial result θ(t) = θ(0). In this case there
is no learning throughout the training process. We now generalize equation (3) to the time varying
setting of equation (2):
θ(t+ 1)− θ(t) =
∑
j∈J
Mj
N
θ˜j(t) + βθ(t), (5)
leading to the first order stochastic differential equation with Wiener noise variables Wtij :
dθ(t) =
βθ(t) +∑
j∈J
Mj
N
θj(t)
 dt+∑
j∈J
(
Mj
N
(1 + β)ηdWt1j +
Mj
N
ρjdWt
2
j
)
. (6)
Theorem 1 (Plain free-riding). Assuming that ∀j ∈ J ∃αj ∈ R+ s.t. |θ˙j(t)| = O(t−αj ), federated
learning with plain free-riders (4) converges in expectation to the aggregated federated model of the
fair clients:
E [θ(t)] t→+∞−−−−→
∑
j∈J
Mj
N −MK θj(t), (7)
Var [θ(t)] = Vη2,{ρj}
t→+∞−−−−→ (N −
∑
jMj)
2
2N2
1∑
j
Mj
N
∑
j
(
Mj
N
)2η2 +
1
2
∑
j
Mj
N
∑
j
(
Mj
N
)2ρ2j .
(8)
Since the output of plain free-riders is deterministic, this result arises from the perturbed process of
the fair clients. On one hand, as soon as the perturbation η introduced by the attack is small enough,
plain free-riders expect to converge to the fair clients’ aggregation with convergence speed O(eβt).
On the other hand, Theorem 1 shows that the uncertainty of the process depends on the trade-off
between free-riders and fair clients contributions. We note that in the limit case
∑
jMj = N (only
fair participants) the uncertainty is uniquely due to the the fair clients’ variability governed by ρi,
as the first term of (8) is zero. With only free-riders (
∑
jMj = 0) we obtain the trivial solution
discussed for equation (4).
2.4 Disguised free-riding
Plain free-riders can be easily detected by the server, since for each iteration the condition θk(t)−
θ(t) = 0 is true. We study here improved attack strategies based on the sharing of opportunely
disguised parameters. Free-riders should ideally return disguised parameters θk(t) = fk(θ(t)) such
that in expectation we obtain E [θk(t)] = θ(t). Simulating the behavior of a fair client also requires
the free-rider to simulate convergence: the magnitude of the update should be more important at the
beginning of the training and approaching zero towards the end.
In what follows we investigate sufficient conditions on the perturbation models to obtain the desired
convergence behaviour of free-rider attacks.
2.4.1 Attacks based on additive stochastic perturbations
A disguised free-rider with additive noise generalizes the plain one, and uploads parameters θk(t) =
θ(t) + ϕ(t)(t). Here, the perturbation (t) is assumed to be Gaussian white noise, and ϕ(t) > 0 is a
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suitable time-varying perturbation compatible with the free-rider attack. In this new setting, we can
rewrite the FedAvg aggregation process (1) as follows:
θ(t+ 1) =
∑
j∈J
Mj
N
θ˜j(t) +
MK
N
θ(t) +
MK
N
ϕ(t)(t). (9)
Extending the plain case, the relationship leads to the following stochastic differential equation:
dθ(t) =
βθ(t) +∑
j∈J
Mj
N
θj(t)
 dt+∑
j∈J
(
Mj
N
(1 + β)ηdWt1j +
Mj
N
ρjdWt
2
j
)
+
MK
N
ϕ(t)dWt. (10)
Theorem 2 (Single disguised free-rider). Under the conditions of Theorem 1, let the perturbation
model ϕ(t) in equation (10) be such that ϕ(t) = O(t−γ), with γ > 0. Then, federated learning (9)
converges to the aggregated model of the fair clients. We have:
E [θ(t)] t→+∞−−−−→
∑
j∈J
Mj
N −MK θj(t), and Var [θ(t)]
t→+∞−−−−→ Vη2,{ρj} (11)
The extension to this result to the case of multiple free-riders requires to account in equation (10) for
an attack of the form
∑
k∈K
M
(k)
K
N ϕk(t)dWtk, where M
(k)
K is the sample size declared by free-rider
k. Corollary 1 follows from the linearity of this functional.
Corollary 1 (Multiple disguised free-riders). If the perturbation model ϕk(t) of each free-rider
is such that ϕk(t) = O(t−γk), with γk > 0, the result of Theorem 2 still holds when combining
multiple free-riders in equation (9).
2.4.2 Time-varying noise model of fair-clients evolution
Theorem 2 provides us with conditions on the decay of the noisy update an attacker should design to
ensure convergence of the process. Interestingly, the general decaying shape identified for ϕ(t) can
be seamlessly translated to define sufficient conditions for the time-varying variability ρj(t) of the
fair clients, to ensure compatibility with the federated learning process.
Corollary 2. Let the fair clients evolve according to θ˜j(t) = θj(t) + ρj(t)ζj(t), where θj(t) are
smoothly convergent functions and ζj(t) is delta-correlated unit variance Gaussian white noise. If the
functions ρj(t) are such that ρj(t) = O(t−aj ), with aj > 0, then the aggregation process of federated
learning in equation (1) is such that E [θ(t)] t→+∞−−−−→∑j∈J MjN−MK θj(t), and Var [θ(t)] t→+∞−−−−→ 0.
Under the same conditions, the asymptotic variance of Theorems 1 and 2 reduces to Var [θ(t)] t→+∞−−−−→
(N−∑jMj)2
2N2
1∑
j
Mj
N
∑
j(
Mj
N )
2η2.
Corollary 2 enables the generalization of our theory to more realistic noise models for the fair clients.
We can indeed relax the initial stationarity assumption on the variability of the parameters’ evolution,
to account for smoothly decaying perturbations when approaching the client optima during training.
Furthermore, it is interesting to notice that in this case the variability of the global model under
free-rider attacks is uniquely due to the perturbation η2 induced by the free-riders.
3 Experiments
This experimental section focuses on a series of benchmarks for the proposed free-rider attacks.
The methods being of general application, the focus here is to empirically demonstrate our the-
ory on diverse experimental setups and model specifications. All code, data and experiments are
available at https://github.com/Accenture/Labs-Federated-Learning/tree/
free-rider_attacks/
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Figure 1: Accuracy performances for (a) FedAvg and (b) FedProx in the different experimental
scenarios (20 local training epochs). The shaded blue region indicates the variability of federated
learning model with fair clients only, estimated from 30 different training initialization.
3.1 Experimental Details
We consider 5 fair clients for each of the following scenarios:
MNIST (classification in iid and non-iid settings). We study a standard classification problem on
MNIST [13] and create two benchmarks: an iid dataset (MNIST iid) where we give 600 training
digits and 300 testing digits to each client, and a non-iid dataset (MNIST non-iid), where for each
digit we create two shards with 150 training samples and 75 testing samples, and allocate 4 shards for
each client. For each scenario, we use a logistic regression predictor.
Shakespeare (LSTM prediction). We study a LSTM model for next character prediction on the
dataset of The Complete Works of William Shakespeare [11]. We randomly choose 5 clients with
more than 3000 samples, and assign 70% of the dataset to training and 30% to testing. Each client
has on average 6415.4 samples (±1835.6) . We use a two-layer LSTM classifier containing 100
hidden units with an 8 dimensional embedding layer. The model takes as an input a sequence of
80 characters, embeds each of the characters into a learned 8-dimensional space and outputs one
character per training sample after 2 LSTM layers and a fully connected one.
We train federated models following in turn FedAvg and FedProx aggregation processes. In FedProx,
the hyperparameter µ monitoring the regularization is chosen according to the best performing
scenario reported in [12]: µ = 1 for MNIST (iid and non-iid), and µ = 0.001 for Shakespeare. For
the free-rider we declare a number of samples equal to the average sample size across fair clients.
We test federated learning with 5 and 20 local epochs using SGD optimization with learning rate
λ = 0.0005 for MNIST (iid and non-iid), and λ = 0.5 for Shakespeare, and batch size of 100.
3.2 Free-rider attacks: convergence and performances
Designing a free-rider attack requires to specify a perturbation function ϕ(t) ∈ O(t−γ), for a general
parameter γ > 0. While the design of optimally disguised free-rider attacks is out of the scope of
this study, here we propose heuristics to tune the perturbations parameters according to practical
hypothesis on the parameters evolution. These hypothesis are discussed and refined in Section 3.3.
In the following experiments, we investigate free-rider attacks taking the simple form ϕ(t) = σt−γ .
The parameter γ is chosen among a panel of testing parameters γ ∈ {0.5, 1, 2}. After random
initialization at the initial federated learning step, the parameter σ is instead opportunely estimated to
mimic the extent of the distribution of the update ∆θ = θ(1)− θ(0) observed between consecutive
rounds of federated learning. We can simply model these increments as a zero-centered univariate
Gaussian distribution, and assign the parameter σ to the value of the fitted standard deviation.
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Figure 2: Plots for FedAvg and E = 20. Accuracy performances for FedAvg according to the number
of free-riders participating in the learning process: 50% (top), and 90% (bottom) of the total amount
of clients.
According to this strategy, the free-rider would return parameters θk(t) with perturbations distributed
as the ones observed between two consecutive optimization rounds.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the model obtained with FedAvg (20 local training epochs) with
respect to different scenarios: 1) fair clients only, 2) plain free-rider, 3) disguised free-rider with decay
parameter γ = 1, and estimated noise level σ, and 4) disguised free-rider with noise level increased to
3σ. For each scenario, we compare the federated model obtained under free-rider attacks with respect
to the equivalent model obtained with the participation of the fair clients only. For this latter setting,
to assess the model training variability, we repeated the training 30 times with different parameter
initializations. The results show that, independently from the chosen free-riding strategy, the resulting
models attain comparable performances with respect to the one of the model obtained with fair clients
only. Similar results are obtained for the setup with 5 local training epochs and different values of γ
(Appendix C.1). We also quantified the equivalence of the models parameter-wise, via the average L2
distance, and in terms of the overall parameter distribution, through the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS)
test (Appendix C.2), confirming that for each scenario the free-riders converge to the fair client’s
model, whereas the 3σ scenario seems to lead to larger dissimilarities. This result is in agreement
with Theorem 2 and also suggests that the perturbation η induced by the attacks is generally small.
We investigate the same training setup under the influence of multiple free-riders. In particular, we
test the scenarios where the free-riders declare respectively 50% and 90% of the total training sample
size. In practice, we maintain the same experimental setting composed by 5 fair clients, and we
increase the number of free-riders to respectively 5 and 45, while declaring for each free-rider a
sample size equal to the average number of samples of the fair clients.
Figure 3: Distribution of the pa-
rameter update ∆θ for FedAvg with
MNIST non-iid and E = 20. The
distribution is optimally modelled
by a mixture of 3 Gaussians.
Figure 2 shows that, independently from the magnitude of the
perturbation function, the number of free-riders does not seem
to affect the performance of the final aggregated model. On the
contrary, the convergence speed is importantly impacted, as it
is sensibly slower in the 90% free-riders scenario. This result is
confirmed when inspecting the dissimilarity with respect to the
fair clients’ model in terms of L2 and KS measures (Appendix
C.2), and is similar for the setup with 5 local training epochs,
and with FedProx (Appendix C.1).
3.3 Advanced Free-rider attacks
This section illustrates practical directions for improving the
disguising scheme by leveraging on the general result of The-
orem 2. The key observation is that the form of a model update
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Figure 4: Comparison of free-rider and fair client’s parameters with respect to the global model
(FedAvg, MNIST non-iid, 20 local training epochs). Evolution of Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) statistic
(top), L2 distance (middle), and model accuracy (bottom) across optimization rounds.
during training is generally non Gaussian (Figure 3). In most
cases, a general parameter update ∆θ(t) = θ(t)− θ(t− 1) is
zero-centered and heavily skewed, with only some parameters affected by large changes between
optimization rounds. For this reason, the creation of a synthetic update based on a Gaussian model
may still be easily identified at the server level, for example by simple comparison of the distribution
of the free-rider parameters with respect to the global model’s one (Figure 4, column A). To improve
the realism of the attack, we investigate disguising schemes based on the fitting of multimodal
distribution forms for the update. In particular, we model the initial global update, ∆θ = θ(1)− θ(0),
through Gaussian Mixture Modeling (GMM), where the optimal number of 3 Gaussian components
was established according to the associated Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC).
Each parameter of the model is assigned to one of the clusters, depending on the extent of the relative
update. Similarly as in Section 3.2, each parameter is associated with a perturbation σ equal to
the standard deviation of the respective Gaussian component, thus obtaining 3 different evolution
profiles characterized by increasing magnitude. While this strategy aims at obtaining a more realistic
representation of the variability of the features’ update across optimization rounds, the GMM may
still lead to overly smooth simulated parameters, since it is based on the modeling of the average
quantity ∆θ (Figure 4, column B). This issue can be overcome by random generation of ‘skews’, for
example by assigning a subset of parameters to outlier values, to mimic specificity of the training on
the local dataset. The subset is here chosen as 10 parameters belonging to the Gaussian component
with highest variance, to which we assign a perturbation value σ equal to 25 times their variance
(Figure 4, column C). Finally, the profile of the perturbation ϕ(t) may not faithfully follow the model
evolution over long time horizons. Figure 4, column D, shows that re-calibration of the perturbation
parameters σ after a fixed number of rounds (here 50) can improve the realism of the update.
4 Conclusion and discussion
In this work, we introduced a theoretical framework for the study of free-riding attacks on model
aggregation in Federated Learning. Based on the proposed methodology, we proved that simple
strategies based on returning the global model at each iteration already lead to successful free-rider
attacks (plain free-riding), and we investigated more sophisticated disguising techniques relying on
stochastic perturbations of the parameters (disguised free-riding). The convergence of each attack
was demonstrated through theoretical proofs and experimental results.
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This work opens the way to the investigation of optimal disguising and defense strategies for free-
rider attacks, beyond the proposed heuristics. Our experiments show that inspection of the client’s
distribution should be established as a routine practice for the detection of free-rider attacks in
federated learning. This result motivates the study of more effective free-riding strategies, based on
different noise model distributions and perturbation schemes. We will also work on the improvement
of detection at the server level, through better modeling of the heterogeneity of the incoming clients’
parameters. Finally, this study relies on a number of hypothesis concerning the evolution of the
clients’ parameters during federated learning. This choice provides us with a convenient theoretical
setup for the formalization of the proposed theory which may be modified in the future, for example,
for investigating more complex forms variability and parameters aggregation.
Broader Impact
The problem of free-rider attacks in federated learning may have significant economical and societal
impact. Since it allows clients’ participation without sharing the data, federated learning is becoming
the de-facto training setup in current large-scale machine learning projects in several critical appli-
cations, such as healthcare, banking, and telecommunication. The resulting models derived from
sensitive and protected data may have high commercial and intellectual value as well, due to their
exclusive nature. Our research proves that if precautions are not taken, malicious clients can disguise
their participation to federated learning to appropriate a federated model without providing any con-
tribution. Our research therefore stimulates the investigation of novel verification techniques for the
implementation of secured federated learning projects, to avoid intellectual property or commercial
losses.
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A Complete Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. The aggregation at the server level follows:
θ(t+ 1) =
∑
j∈J
Mj
N
θ˜j(t) +
MK
N
θ(t). (12)
By considering an infinitesimal increment of time we obtain the following first order stochastic
differential equation:
θ˙(t) =
∑
j∈J
Mj
N
θ˜j(t) + βθ(t), (13)
where we define β = MKN − 1. According to the noise process hypothesis of Section (2.2), we thus
obtain the stochastic differential equation:
dθ(t) =
βθ(t) +∑
j∈J
Mj
N
θj(t)
 dt+∑
j∈J
(
Mj
N
(1 + β)ηdW 1j (t) +
Mj
N
ρjdW
2
j (t)
)
, (14)
with associated solution:
θ(t) = eβt[c0 +
∑
j∈J
Mj
N
∫ t
t0
e−βx θj(x)dx︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
+
∑
j∈J
Mj
N
(1 + β)η
∫ t
t0
e−βxdW 1j x︸ ︷︷ ︸
B1
+
∑
j∈J
Mj
N
ρj
∫ t
t0
e−βxdW 2j x︸ ︷︷ ︸
B2
], (15)
where we denote c0 = e−βt0θ(t0). In the following part of the proof we study the asymptotic
properties of solution 15 separately.
• Asymptotic convergence of A. We study the asymptotic properties of (A) by first integrating
by parts the integrals
∫ t
t0
e−βx θj(x) dx:∫ t
t0
e−βxθj(x)dx = [− 1
β
e−βxθj(x)]tt0 +
∫ t
t0
1
β
e−βxθ˙j(x)dx
= − 1
β
e−βtθj(t) +
1
β
∫ t
t0
e−βxθ˙j(x)dx+ C. (16)
To investigate the asymptotic properties of the combination of the integrals (16) in equation
(15), we first note that MjN
1
β =
Mj
MK−N . We can therefore study the limit t → ∞ of the
quantity:
g(t) =
∑
j∈J
Mj
MK −N e
βt
∫ t
t0
e−βx θ˙j(x) dx. (17)
We assume smooth convergence for θj(t) under the condition |θ˙j | = O( 1tαj ), i.e. ∃ tj , Ri ∈
R+ such that ∀t ≥ tj , |θj(t)| ≤ Ritαj . By considering t0 = maxj∈J(tj), α = minj∈J(αj)
and t > t0, the triangular inequality gives:
|g(t)| ≤
∑
j∈J
Mj
MK −N e
βt|
∫ t
t0
e−βxθ˙j(x) dx|, (18)
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and for the assumption of piece-wise continuity of θ˙j in [t0, t] we get:
|g(t)| ≤
∑
j∈J
Mj
N −MK e
βt
∫ t
t0
e−βx|θ˙j(x)|dx
≤
∑
j∈J
Mj
N −MKRie
βt
∫ t
t0
e−βx
xα
dx. (19)
Since that α > 0, t0 > 0 and −β > 0, lemma in Proposition B.1 shows that
|g(t)| ≤ eβt
∫ t
t0
e−βx
xα
dx
t→+∞−−−−→ 0. (20)
(21)
• Asymptotic convergence of B1 and B2. The asymptotic properties of the stochastic
integrals B1 and B2 follow from the general properties of Ito’s integrals. For any constant L,
we have:
E
[
Leβt
∫ t
t0
e−βxdWx
]
= 0, (22)
Var
[
Leβt
∫ t
t0
e−βxdWx
]
= L2e2βt
∫ t
t0
e−2βxdWx (23)
= −L
2e2βt
2β
(e−2βt − e−2βt0) t→+∞−−−−→ −L
2
2β
, (24)
where the first equality in line (23) is due to Ito’s isometry.
By substituting in equation (15) the convergence results for the quantities (16), (22) and (23), we
finally conclude that:
E [θ(t)] t→+∞−−−−→
∑
j∈J
Mj
N −MK θj(t), (25)
Var [θ(t)]
t→+∞−−−−→ − 1
2β
∑
j∈J
(
Mj
N
)2
(
(1 + β)2η2 + ρ2j
)
(26)
= − (1 + β)
2η2
2β
∑
j∈J
(
Mj
N
)2 − 1
2β
∑
j∈J
(
Mj
N
)2ρ2j (27)
=
(N −∑jMj)2η2
2N2
N∑
jMj
∑
j
(
Mj
N
)2 +
N
2
∑
jMj
∑
j
(
Mj
N
)2ρ2j (28)
=
(N −∑jMj)2η2
2N2
1∑
j
Mj
N
∑
j
(
Mj
N
)2 +
1
2
∑
j
Mj
N
∑
j
(
Mj
N
)2ρ2j . (29)
Note: in the special case β = 0, then equation (12) can be expressed as θ(t + 1) = θ(t) thus
θ(t) = θ0(t).
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. The differential equation governing the disguised attack is
dθ(t) =
βθ(t) +∑
j∈J
Mj
N
θj(t)
 dt+∑
j∈J
(
Mj
N
(1 + β)ηdWt1j +
Mj
N
ρjdWt
2
j
)
+
MK
N
ϕ(t)dWt. (30)
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We note that this equation differs from the one in proof (A.1) for the last term only. We derive
conditions for the perturbation ϕ(t) > 0 for ensuring convergence, by studying the integral
L(t) = eβt
∫ t
t0
ϕ(x)e−βxdWx. (31)
We prove the convergence of L(t) when ϕ(t) = O(t−γ), γ > 0. In particular, let σ > 0 and t0 > 0
such that ϕ(t) ≤ σt−γ , for t > t0. We thus have L(t) ≤ L′(t) = σeβt
∫ t
t0
e−βx
xγ dWx, and
E [L′(t)] t→+∞−−−−→ 0, (32)
Var [L′(t)] = σ2e2βt
∫ t
t0
e−2βx
x2γ
dWx
t→+∞−−−−→ 0, (33)
where the limit of the variance is a consequence of Proposition B.1.
A.3 Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. The differential equation governing the disguised attack for many free-riders:
dθ(t) =
βθ(t) +∑
j∈J
Mj
N
θj(t)
 dt+∑
j∈J
(
Mj
N
(1 + β)ηdWt1j +
Mj
N
ρjdWt
2
j
)
+
∑
k∈K
Mk
N
ϕk(t)dWtk. (34)
We note that this equation differs from the one in proof (A.1) for the last term only. Since proof
(A.2) already proves the convergence for a single term Lk(t) = eβt
∫ t
t0
ϕk(x)e
−βxdWx. when
ϕk(t) = O(t
−γk), γk > 0. The corollary thus follows from the linearity of the last term:
E [θ(t)] t→+∞−−−−→
∑
j∈J
Mj
N −MK θj(t) and Var [θ(t)] =
t→+∞−−−−→ Vη2,{ρj}. (35)
A.4 Proof of Corollary 2
Proof. We consider ρj(t) = O(t−aj ) with αj > 0 for t > t0 > 0. We show in proof (A.2) that for
Lρj (t) = MjN eβt
∫ t
t0
ρj(t)e
−βxdW 2j x, we have:
E
[Lρj (t)] t→+∞−−−−→ 0 and Var [Lρj (t)] t→+∞−−−−→ 0 (36)
Thus for Theorem 1 and 2 and for Corollary 1, the asymptotic convergence of θ(t) follows:
E [θ(t)] t→+∞−−−−→
∑
j∈J
Mj
N −MK θj(t), (37)
Var [θ(t)]
t→+∞−−−−→ − 1
2β
∑
j∈J
(
Mj
N
)2(1 + β)2η2 (38)
= − (1 + β)
2η2
2β
∑
j∈J
(
Mj
N
)2 (39)
=
(N −∑jMj)2η2
2N2
N∑
jMj
∑
j
(
Mj
N
)2 (40)
=
(N −∑jMj)2η2
2N2
1∑
j
Mj
N
∑
j
(
Mj
N
)2. (41)
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B Calculus
Proposition B.1. ∀ t0, k, α ∈ R+, the following limit holds:
e−kt
∫ t
t0
ekx
xα
dx
t→+∞−−−−→ 0.
Proof. Let us consider t, t0, k ∈ R+, α ∈ (0, 1), and define h such that h(t, t0, k, α) =
e−kt
∫ t
t0
ekx
xα dx.
Writing the exponential as a power series, we get:
h(t, t0, k, α) = e
−kt
∫ t
t0
+∞∑
n=0
(kx)n
n!
1
xα
dx. (42)
Considering that ∀(x, n), (kx)nn! 1xα ≥ 0, we can use the Fubini/Tonelli theorem and permute the sum
and the integral which gives:
h(t, t0, k, α) = e
−kt
+∞∑
n=0
∫ t
t0
kn
n!
xn−α dx (43)
= e−kt
+∞∑
n=0
kn
n!
[
xn−α+1
n− α+ 1]
t
t0 (44)
= e−kt[
+∞∑
n=0
kn
n!
tn−α+1
n− α+ 1 −
+∞∑
n=0
kn
n!
tn−α+10
n− α+ 1] (45)
= e−kt[t1−αl(t, k, α)− t1−α0 l(t0, k, α)], (46)
with l(x, k, α) =
∑+∞
n=0
kn
n!
xn
n−α+1 .
The theorem of Cauchy-Hadamard tells us that the radius of convergence of l(x, α) is R
kn+1
(n+1)!
1
(n+1)−α+1
kn
n!
1
n−α+1
=
k
n+ 1
n− α+ 1
n− α+ 2
n→+∞−−−−−→ 0. (47)
We find a convenient upper bound l(x) without a power series:
l(x, k, α) ≤ 1
1− α +
+∞∑
n=1
kn
n!
2
n+ 1
tn (48)
=
1
1− α +
2
kt
+∞∑
n=2
kn
n!
tn (49)
=
1
1− α +
2
kt
[ekt − kt− 1]. (50)
which gives the following upper bound for l(t)
h(t, t0, k, α) ≤ e
−ktt1−α
1− α +
2
ktα
− 2e−ktt1−α − 2
tα
e−kt − t1−α0 l(t0)e−kt. (51)
Given that k and α are positive and that h(t, t0, k, α) ≥ 0 we finally get:
h(t, t0, k, α) = e
−kt
∫ t
t0
ekx
xα
dx
t→+∞−−−−→ 0. (52)
In the case where α ≥ 1, ∃γ ∈ (0, 1) s.t. 1α ≤ 1γ , and we obtain:
h(t, t0, k, α) ≤ h(t, t0, k, γ) t→+∞−−−−→ 0. (53)
Finally:
∀(t0, k, α) ∈ R+3, h(t, t0, k, α) = e−kt
∫ t
t0
ekx
xα
dx
t→+∞−−−−→ 0. (54)
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C Additional experimental results
C.1 Accuracy Performances
Figure 5: Accuracy performances for (a) FedAvg and (b) FedProx in the different experimental
scenarios (20 local training epochs). The shaded blue region indicates the variability of federated
learning model with fair clients only, estimated from 30 different training initialization.
Figure 6: Accuracy performances for (a) FedAvg and (b) FedProx in the different experimental
scenarios (5 local training epochs). The shaded blue region indicates the variability of federated
learning model with fair clients only, estimated from 30 different training initialization.
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Figure 7: Plots for FedAvg and E = 20. Accuracy performances for FedAvg according to the number
of free-riders participating in the learning process: 50% (top), and 90% (bottom) of the total amount
of clients. The shaded blue region indicates the variability of federated learning model with fair
clients only, estimated from 30 different training initialization.
Figure 8: Plots for FedProx and E = 20. Accuracy performances for FedProx according to the
number of free-riders participating in the learning process: 50% (top), and 90% (bottom) of the total
amount of clients.
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Figure 9: Plots for FedAvg and E = 5. Accuracy performances for FedAvg according to the number
of free-riders participating in the learning process: 50% (top), and 90% (bottom) of the total amount
of clients.
Figure 10: Plots for FedProx and E = 5. Accuracy performances for FedProx according to the
number of free-riders participating in the learning process: 50% (top), and 90% (bottom) of the total
amount of clients.
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C.2 L2 norm and KS test
Figure 11: KS test for (a) FedAvg and (b) FedProx in the different experimental scenarios (20 local
training epochs).
Figure 12: L2 norm for (a) FedAvg and (b) FedProx in the different experimental scenarios (20 local
training epochs).
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Figure 13: KS test for (a) FedAvg and (b) FedProx in the different experimental scenarios (5 local
training epochs).
Figure 14: L2 norm for (a) FedAvg and (b) FedProx in the different experimental scenarios (5 local
training epochs).
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Figure 15: Plots for FedAvg and E = 20. KS Test for FedAvg according to the number of free-riders
participating in the learning process: 50% (top), and 90% (bottom) of the total amount of clients.
Figure 16: Plots for FedAvg and E = 20. L2 norm for FedAvg according to the number of free-riders
participating in the learning process: 50% (top), and 90% (bottom) of the total amount of clients.
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Figure 17: Plots for FedProx and E = 20. KS test for FedProx according to the number of free-riders
participating in the learning process: 50% (top), and 90% (bottom) of the total amount of clients.
Figure 18: Plots for FedProx and E = 20. L2 norm for FedProx according to the number of
free-riders participating in the learning process: 50% (top), and 90% (bottom) of the total amount of
clients.
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Figure 19: Plots for FedAvg and E = 5. KS Test for FedAvg according to the number of free-riders
participating in the learning process: 50% (top), and 90% (bottom) of the total amount of clients.
Figure 20: Plots for FedAvg and E = 5. L2 norm for FedAvg according to the number of free-riders
participating in the learning process: 50% (top), and 90% (bottom) of the total amount of clients.
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Figure 21: Plots for FedProx and E = 5. KS test for FedProx according to the number of free-riders
participating in the learning process: 50% (top), and 90% (bottom) of the total amount of clients.
Figure 22: Plots for FedProx andE = 5. L2 Norm for FedProx according to the number of free-riders
participating in the learning process: 50% (top), and 90% (bottom) of the total amount of clients.
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